Recent Developments by unknown
BAN RUPTCY-PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS-PROPERTY OBTAINED
UNDER AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAusE-Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967)-The voidable preference prob-
lem, which involves a possible conflict between section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act1 and section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,2 arose in the principal case under the following facts. On
April 30, 1962, the defendant, Rudnick, made a loan to Boyle Sun-
dries, Inc. in the amount of 110,000 dollars. A security agreement
was executed in connection with the loan, which purported to give
the creditor a security interest in the debtor's "equipment, . . . in-
ventory and accounts receivable . . . together with all additions
thereto and all property now or hereafter substituted therefore or
otherwise acquired in the ordinary course of business." A financing
statement recording the essentials of this security agreement was
properly filed on May 2, 1962. On October 24, 1962, the debtor
having failed to pay the debt, the creditor under the security agree-
ment seized the debtor's inventory and sold it. On November 9,
1962, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against Boyle
Sundries, Inc. The trustee in bankruptcy contended the transfers
to Rudnick of collateral which the debtor acquired within the four
month period preceding bankruptcy were voidable preferences and
should be set aside. The court held, however, that for the purpose
of determining the date of the alleged preferential transfer, the
security interest in the debtor's inventory, which included after-
acquired items, was effective as of the date of the agreement's execu-
tion and filing. Thus the transfer must be regaTded as having taken
place on May 2, 1962. 4
Section 60(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act contains the following
definition of a preferential transfer:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act,5 of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on
1 11 US.C. § 96 (1964).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108 [herinafter cited as U.C.C.].
3 Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp 635, 636 (D. Mass. 1967).
4 Id. at 638.
5 Transfer shall include thd sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest therein
or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by
or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment,
pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; the retention
of a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer
suffered by such debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
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account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor
while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class.6
One of the conditions precedent to a preferential transfer is
that the transfer must occur within the four month period preced-
ing bankruptcy. But it appears that the effect of the Rosenberg
decision is to make rights in the property received by the debtor
during the four months preceding bankruptcy unassailable by the
trustee in bankruptcy as a voidable transfer. According to the deci-
sion, after-acquired collateral is deemed transferred at the time the
executed security agreement is properly filed.
Section 60(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act states that a transfer
of property is deemed made
when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on
a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.7
This lien creditor tests provided for by the Bankruptcy Act leaves
the question of the requisite perfection to state law. 9 The court in
Rosenberg recognized that U.C.C. sections 9-303(1)10 and 9-204(1)"
6 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1964).
7 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
8 Such a lien is defined as one arising in the ordinary course of legal or
equitable proceedings upon the entry or docketing of a judgment of decree.
or upon an attachment, garnishment, execution, or like process, whether be-
fore, upon or after the judgment or decree, or whether before or upon a levy.
The lien, then, is the one which a party to a simple contract might secure by
a judicial proceeding, either by virtue or a pre-judgment attachment or gar-
nishment, or by virtue of the decree or judgment itself (where state law gives
rise to a lien upon the entry of such judgment or decree) or by further process
to give effect thereto, as where the lien does not arise until levy of an execu-
t.ion....
W. Co =.uR, BANR nTUcy Acr § 60(a)(4), comment (pamph. ed. 1964); see Comment,
Proposed Amendment to Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act, 57 YAt.E L.J. 828 (1948).
9 See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 US. 365, 370 (1945); Corn Exch. Nat'1
Bank v. Klauder, 318 US. 434 (1943); Matthews v. James Talott, Inc., 345 F.2d 374
(7th Cir. 1965).
lo U.C.C. § 9-303(1) in part says-
A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all the appli-
cable steps required for perfection have been taken. ....
11 U.C.C. § 9-204(1) provides:
A security interest cannot attach until there is an agreement (Subsection (3) of
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indicate that the items of inventory acquired by Boyle within the
four-month period preceding bankruptcy constitute a voidable trans-
fer.12 These Code sections state that a security interest cannot be per-
fected until the debtor obtains rights in the collateral. Rosenberg
suggests, however, that the perfection required by the lien creditor
test in the Bankruptcy Act is not the same as the full perfection
stipulated in the Code. In other words, section 70(a)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act required the use of state law to determine when the
secured creditor has so far perfected his security interest that no
subsequent lien creditor can obtain rights superior to his in the
collateral.18 Thus it makes no difference whether or not the debtor
has acquired property rights in the after-acquired property as long
as no subsequent lien creditor can obtain rights superior to the
creditor.
Therefore, under the Bankruptcy Act it is essential to deter-
mine the rights of a subsequent lien creditor under existing state
law. Rudnick had an unperfected security interest in the Code sense
because, at the time the executed security agreement was filed, the
debtor, Boyle, did not have rights in the subsequently-acquired
collateral. Section 9-301(1)(a) provides that when a creditor has
an unperfected security interest his rights are subordinate to the
rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge
of the creditor's security interest and before perfection under the
Code. By filing the security agreement, Rudnick did all that he
could do in order to obtain perfection under the Code. The only
remaining condition precedent to the Code perfection of his secu-
rity interest was the obtaining by Boyle of rights in the collateral.
However, if the knowledge requirement under section 9-301(l)(a)
is actual knowledge, Rudnick's security agreement, even though it
was properly filed, might be invalid against subsequent lien creditors.
If this were the rule, filing would not always be enough to protect
creditors in Rudnick's position from an honest mistake as to the
Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights In
the collateral.
12 But see Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUbt. L. REv. 49, 53.55
(1962).
13 Accord, In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Mattes v. American
Acceptance Corp., 204 F. Supp. 26 (M.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 801 F.2d 908 (3d
Cir. 1962), appears to hold that property may be transferred for purposes of § 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act even before the debtor receives possession of it. Contra, Kennedy,
The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems
Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RuTGERs L. Ray. 518 (1960).
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existence of prior creditors. But this interpretation of the knowl-
edge required by U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(a) is at best tenuous; most
authorities state that a constructive knowledge standard is required.14
A justification given by the court to support the result is the
entity or floating lien doctrine.15 Briefly, the entity theory views
inventory subject to an after-acquired security interest as a single
entity, not as individual items each subject to a separate lien. U.C.O.
section 9-205, which validates a floating lien,16 seems to support
this position. But a closer examination of this section shows that
while it validates a security interest when the debtor has liberty to
dispose of the collateral without being required to account for pro-
ceeds of substitute new collateral, section 9-205 does not apply with
regard to the time of perfection of an agreement containing an after-
acquired property clause. Therefore, the entity theory cannot pre-
vail when the Code in no uncertain terms states that a security
interest is not perfected until the debtor receives rights in the col-
lateral. 17 Rosenberg uses this floating lien concept as an incidental
argument and recogizes that it relates more to considerations of
policy18 than to any explicit statutory law.
14 See Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Prop-
erty Clauses Under the Code, U. PA. L. REv. 194, 215 (1959); Gordon, supra note 12,
at 66, 67.
15 Perhaps the most quoted and best enundated statement of the entity theory
was made by Judge Magruder in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 831
(1st Cir. 1951):
In other words, the res which is the subject of the lien... is the merchandise
or stock in trade, conceived of as a unit presently and continuously in existence
-a "floating mass," the component elements of which may be constantly
changing without affecting the identity of the res.
However, in conclusion he states that it would be "far-fetched" to read into the New
Hampshire Factor's Act any such sophisticated concept. 186 F.2d at 831.
16 The Code treats the floating lien as a security interest in which the creditor
permits the debtor to use, commingle, and dispose of all or part of the col-
lateral ... with similar articles.
Note, Uniform Commercial Code--Attempt by Secured Creditor Under Article 9 to
Emulate Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 Ky. LJ. 154, 163 (1962).
17 King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It Insulate the
Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. I. REv. 1117,
1123; 3 W. CoLux, BAxNrmTcy §§ 60.19, 60.59 (14th rev. ed. 1964). But:
Article 9 does not expressly adopt the 'entity' theory.as to receivables or as to
inventory. On the other hand, it does not reject the theory as to either cate-
gory, taking no position, expressly or by implication, it leaves the way open
for a free case.law development.
II G. GH.MoRE, Scuarnr It-rEmsr ix PERsoNAL PROP.REY § 45.5 (1965).
18 In view of the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code has now been
1968]
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While not sanctioning a transfer in regard to after-acquired
collateral as occurring at the time of the filing of the executed secu-
rity agreement, U.C.C. sections 9-205 and 9-108 taken together in
essence provide for an automatic attachment 0 of a floating lien on
after-acquired property.20 Professor William E. Hogan discerns this
Code-endorsed floating lien as another attempt by the Code:
to improve the position of the secured creditor as against the
unsecured creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy . . . . The
after-acquired property problem, created by the rights-in-the-
collateral issue, is an example of a latent provision in the Code
inviting secured creditors to gobble up the assets of the debtor
prior to the time any unsecured creditor could even begin to
take action, at least as to the goods. Coupled together, these
various freedoms extended to the secured creditor should in-
duce the courts to read the Code stringently when secured
creditors are asserting rights. Otherwise, the unsecured lien
creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy will have no assets that
can be reached. 21
By holding that there was no preference within the meaning
of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, Rosenberg avoided grounding
its decision on Code section 9-108. This section seems to fly in
the face of the Bankruptcy Act, since one of the sine qua nons nec-
essary for the existence of a preferential transfer is that it be for
an antecedent debt. Under the Code, the security interest in after-
acquired collateral is considered to be taken for new value, not as
security for an antecedent debt.22 Even if the trustee's contentions
adopted by 48 states, it would seem that the definition of § 9-108 should be
regarded as generally accepted and in accord with current business practice
and understanding and hence applied in bankruptcy.
Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967). Cf. Friendly, J., In
United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966):
We find persuasive the defendant's suggestion of looking to the Uniform
Commercial Code as a source for the "federal" law of sales. The Code has
been adopted by Congress for the District of Columbia . . . , has been enacted
in over forty states, and is thus well on its way to becoming a truly national
law of commerce, which . . . is "more complete and more certain, than any
other which can conceivably be drawn ...
19 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 215.
20 In Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), the Court held that there Is atn
inherent fraud in this type of unfettered dominion exercised by the debtor.
21 Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17 STAN. L. REV.
822, 840 (1965).
22 U.C.C. § 9-108, Comment 1 makes this bold and unprecedented assertion:
The determination of when a transfer is for [an] antecedent debt is largely
left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law.
See Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
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are correct that the transfers were made to Rudnick at the time
Boyle obtained rights in the merchandise, a case for a preferential
transfer cannot be sustained by the Code because under U.C.C.
section 9-108 the after-acquired property is deemed taken for new
value, not as payment for an antecedent debt.
In Re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,23 which upholds
the decision and rationale of the Rosenberg case, appears to per-
ceive U.C.C. section 9-108 as an application of the substituted col-
lateral doctrine.24 Under this doctrine, after-acquired inventory is
viewed as a substitute for sold inventory. Since the value of the
collateral in the Portland case was approximately the same at the
time of acquiring the security interest and of filing the petition in
bankruptcy, the court reasoned that the creditor was only receiv-
ing a substitution of security. Thus no preference was shown to
this creditor by the debtor.25 If the value of the collateral decreased
instead of remaining the same it would be impossible to apply the
substituted collateral theory. When the original collateral gradually
left the possession of the owner, it did not generate enough new
collateral but resulted in business losses which eventually ended
in bankruptcy. The situation in Portland is rare. The collateral of
the bankrupt usually does not remain the same. Thus in most
preferential transfer cases, the substituted collateral theory used in
Portland would not be applicable.
As the preceding discussion has indicated, the mechanical ap-
plication of the Bankruptcy Act and the Code in cases involving
preferential transfers creates a disharmonious result. Words are an
imperfect attempt at manifesting legislative goals. Although the
literal meanings of the two statutes may clash as applied to void-
able transfers, it is possible that the basic policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Act and the Code are the same.20 The presence of
U.C.C. section 9-108 is one of the strongest arguments against the
Corporate Indenture, 69 YAx.E L.J. 203, 244 (1959); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLuAr. L. 1rv. 232, 236 (1965).
23 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967); see Krause, Kripke and Seligson, The Code
and The Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After.acquired Property,
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 278 (1967).
24 Compare 3 W. Co..aE, .BANMtrCy § 60.21 (14th rev. ed. 1964) with II G.
GirEoa, SEcuRry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PRoPRTn', §§ 45.6. 45.7 (1965).
25 See In re Pusey Maynes, Breish Co. Herr v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 122 F2d
606 (3d Cir. 1941).
26 See Gordon, supra note 12, at 57. It is quite possible that § 9-108 of the Code
expresses a policy in harmony with the Bankruptcy Act, but the means used to formu-
late this policy, i.e., the creation of a fictional definition of antecedent debt, is at
best inartistic.
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Rosenberg and Portland positions that the perfection required
under the Bankruptcy Act is not the same as that required by the
Code. This implies that the drafters of the Code believed that under
U.C.C. section 9-204 a security interest in after-acquired property
attaching within four months of bankruptcy would be subject to
avoidance by the trustee in bankruptcy. However, it is probable
that they were trying to obtain a result in accord with the policies
of both statutes, 27 thereby avoiding confusion and misapplication
of the two Acts in voidable preference cases.
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act was not intended to void a
security interest in after-acquired property received in the ordinary
course of business when adequate notice of such an interest has
been given. Rather it was intended to insure the uniform treatment
of all creditors and to prohibit secret liens and new liens obtained
during the four-month period preceding bankruptcy. By filing
the security agreement with the Secretary of State and the City
Clerk, Rudnick avoided these abuses and achieved the status of a
secured creditor. A prospective creditor of Boyle, by checking the
public records, would find that Rudnick had a security interest in
Boyle's inventory. He would then be on notice to investigate the
situation further. It must be recognized that filing is no panacea.
Admittedly, filing provides for a definite method of determining
the priority of liens, but it is not always commercially expedient
for a prospective creditor to check the public records. For example,
a large department store extending thousands of charge accounts
to its customers does not have time to peruse the public records
when it grants credit. Even though the large department store may
call the local credit bureau for a credit rating of its customer, is it
equitable to charge these large institutions with constructive notice
of the public records? If the answer is in the affirmative these busi-
nesses will look on this burden as an operating cost and will pass
it on to customers. The effect of this will be to make the ordinary
customer, who satisfies his financial obligations, pay for the abuses
perpetrated by the insolvent debtor.
On the other hand, creditors in the position of the Shawmut
Bank, which lent 15,000 dollars to Boyle, extend credit less often
than do large department stores, and their loans are substantially
higher. Consequently the Shawmut Bank presumably made a thor-
ough check into the credit status of Boyle and discovered the security
27 See In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 595, 899.401 (D.
Ore. 1967).
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agreement recorded by Rudnick, for Rudnick had endorsed Boyle's
note.28 Indeed, the bank would have been exercising something less
than due care had it not made a careful examination of the solvency
of Boyle when such an amount of money was involved in the transac-
tion. Therefore, it is apparent that a survey showing what type of
creditor the trustee in bankruptcy usually represents would be ger-
mane to policy considerations in voidable preference cases.
In conclusion, bankruptcy law is uncertain with regard to pref-
erential transfers where after-acquired property is concerned. Al-
though there has not been much litigation in this area, the trend
as evidenced by the recent district court decisions in Rosenberg
and Portland gives security agreements covering after-acquired prop-
erty protection from attack by the trustee in bankruptcy, even when
the debtor has obtained rights in the collateral within the four
month period preceding bankruptcy. But no court of appeals has
yet considered this precise question. The Rosenberg case is not
being appealed, but it is highly probable that Portland will be
appealed and it may eventually reach the Supreme Court. Com-
mercial expediency and the free flow of business demand certainty
as to the effect of after-acquired property clauses used in security
agreements. But in arriving at a result reason and policy should not
be sacrificed on the altar of commercial expediency.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Loss oF
CrrIzENSmP -Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) -In 1960, Beys
Afroyim, a naturalized United States citizen since 1926, attempted
to return to this country from Israel, where he had gone in 1950.
The United States Department of State refused to renew his pass-
port on the grounds that he had lost his citizenship by voluntary
voting in 1951 in an election for the Knesset, the legislative body
of Israel. Section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940,' provides
that a United States citizen shall lose his citizenship if he votes
"in a political election in a foreign state." Afroyim brought a de-
claratory judgment action against the Secretary of State in federal
district court, alleging that section 401 (e) violated both section 1,
28 262 F. Supp. at 636.
1 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964). The provisions for loss of citizenship in the Nation-
ality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 have been incor-
porated into subsection (a) 1-10 of § 1481 of the 1958 United States Code.
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clause 1, of the fourteenth amendment, 2 which expressly grants
citizenship, and the due process clause of the fifth amendment 8 of
the United States Constitution. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for defendant,4 and the plaintiff appealed. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.,
Granting certiorari0, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that sec-
tion 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 was unconstitutional:
Each citizen in this country has a constitutional right to remain a
citizen until he voluntarily relinquishes his citizenship, and the
federal government cannot take this right away.
In 1957 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
section 401 (e) in Perez v. Brownell.7 There the Court reasoned
that Congress had an implied power to regulate foreign relations
which could reasonably be deemed to include the power to deal
with American citizens who voted in foreign elections.8 This power
was found to permit the government to take away United States
citizenship as a consequence of such voting. The theory relied upon
was that voting by a citizen might cause the foreign country to
think the United States desired to interfere in the affairs of the
foreign state, or at least the United States approved of the interfer-
ing acts9 of the citizen. The Court indicated it was the voter's
United States citizenship that made the act potentially embarrass.
ing.'0 A "rational nexus" was found to exist between the means
used-divestiture of citizenship-and the end sought-avoiding em-
barrassment in foreign affairs. Termination of citizenship was thus
within the implied power of Congress under the necessary and
proper clause. 1 Other than the cursory statement that possession
of citizenship caused the embarrassment, the Perez Court did not
inquire into the efficacy of divestiture in eliminating friction.
The path chosen by Congress and approved by the Court in
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Id. amend. V.
4 250 F. Supp. 686 (S. D. N. Y. 1966).
5 361 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1966).
6 385 U.S. 917 (1966).
7 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). This opinion was written by Justice
Frankfurter and represented a 5-4 decision. The AfroyiM decision overruling this
case was also a 54 decision.
8 Id. at 58-59.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 60.
11 Id.
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Perez for avoiding foreign affairs friction is a dubious one. First,
the statute, while providing against voting, overlooks other acts of
political interference, such as campaigning, speech-making, solici-
tation and bribery. Furthermore, even if Congress' failure to act
against seemingly more abnegating behavior is put aside, one may
question the extent to which harm to foreign relations stem from
voting. The harshness of characterizing voting as activity inimical
to United States foreign policy and to attach to it loss of citizen-
ship was one of Chief Justice Warren's main points of dissent in
Perez.12
But such oversights and imprecisions are without Congress'
power unless the statute in question is otherwise unconstitutional.
The striking aspect of the Perez theory is that the vague language
of the necessary and proper clause is invoked with devastating conse-
quences to a citizen. At great expense to the individual, the Act
produces a dubious benefit in the way of avoiding international
embarrassment. An individual's citizenship is a matter between him
and the United States government. There is no assurance that a
putatively offended foreign country would be appeased by this
nation's declaration that a citizen who voted or did some other
specified act is no longer a citizen. The affronted nation may take
expatriation as a sign of the United States' good faith and intention
not to interfere, or the expatriated citizen may be viewed as a
sacrificial lamb, with no diminution in the hostility toward the
United States created by the interference. Thus on closer examina-
tion the "rational nexus" identified in Perez evaporates. The effect
of section 401 becomes almost capricious, always extracting a great
price from the individual citizen and often in vain. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the Afroyim Court found itself unable to adhere
to the theory advanced in Perez.
Instead, the Court took the position that citizenship is a right
which cannot be taken away by congressional action, regardless of
the possible consequences of a citizen's conduct abroad. The advo-
cates of this position base their argument on the fourteenth amend-
ment and the nature of our government. Justice Black states the
fourteenth amendment grants citizenship, and the constitution in
no place provides for the withdrawal of citizenship.13 Because citi-
zenship is such an important right, the power to withdraw it can-
12 Perez v. Brownell, 356 US. 44, 76 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
3 Afroyim v. Rusk, 887 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
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not be implied, 14 particularly under a government which draws its
power to govern from its citizens.' Such a power would permit a
government to free itself of its obligations to its sovereign-the peo-
ple-as it saw fit.
Afroyim's theoretical basis takes the case beyond the narrow
holding that taking away a person's citizenship for voting in a for-
eign election is unconstitutional and makes it clear that any statute
allowing loss of citizenship as the government's remedy would also
be unconstitutional." The implied power theory has been rejected;
unless it can be shown that a person has voluntarily relinquished
his citizenship, no conduct can result in the loss of it.17
Congress is now foreclosed from using divestiture of citizen-
ship as a means of furthering foreign policy. But Afroyim does not
prohibit some means of acting against citizens whose actions give
rise to doubts about their status as citizens. The constitutional
theory that gained majority support in Afroyim does not question
the right of a citizen to voluntarily relinquish his citizenship. Chief
Justice Warren's dissent in Perez recognized that certain acts might
indicate a person's intention to give up his citizenship. In recogniz-
ing the consequences of such action, the government would not be
taking away citizenship in order to implement its general regulatory
power, but rather, would be "simply giving formal recognition to
the inevitable consequences of the citizen's own voluntary surren-
der of his citizenship". 8 Justice Black indicated a belief that Con-
gress could give effect to certain voluntary conduct if the question
were whether the person had voluntarily relinquished citizenship,
rather than whether there was potential harm to the United States
in the act. In a concurring opinion in Nishihawa v. Dulles, he
stated, "of course a citizen has the right to abandon or renounce
his citizenship and Congress can enact measures to regulate and
affirm such abjuration."' 9 What sort of measures are these two
members of the current majority alluding to? To the extent that
an act such as voting in a political election, taking an oath of al-
14 Id.
15 In holding that "Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizcn-
ship under § 401 (e)," the opinion went on to say that the fourteenth amendment
protects every citizen against a congressionally imposed forcible destruction of his
citizenship. Id. at 267-68.
16 Id. at 268.
17 Id.
18 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1958) (dissenting opinion),
19 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (concurring opinion).
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legiance to a foreign country,20 or serving in the military of a for-
eign nation 2' could be said to be inconsistent with the desire to
retain United States citizenship, it might be within congressional
power to designate these acts as evidence of a citizen's desire to give
up his citizenship. In the absence of express language by the citizen,
certain conduct might still be considered as sufficiently indicative
of that citizen's subjective intent, to allow the government to in-
stitute a proceeding to objectively determine the effect of that
conduct. In such a proceeding, the government might still be able
to obtain a decision on the citizenship of an individual who was
causing embarrassment in a foreign country. Instead of the govern-
ment imposing a conclusory presumption of loss of citizenship on
certain overt acts, this would allow a determination of a citizen's
intention, on the basis of evidentiary conduct.
The specified acts that formerly resulted in automatic loss of
citizenship would appear to be the logical starting point for desig-
nating conduct that might now be considered only as evidence that
a citizen wished to give up his citizenship.22 But any such determin-
ation should cover all of the citizen's foreign activity. While it is
difficult to assume that the single act of voting in a foreign election
constitutes a political attachment to that country inconsistent with
continued allegiance to the United States, the act of voting, coupled
with other facts could very well indicate a desire to relinquish Amer-
ican citizenship. Even before Afroyim, the government was required
to prove that the citizen's conduct in the foreign state was the re-
sult of free and intelligent choice.2-3 Afroyim adds the requirement
of an intent to renounce citizenship. It seems unlikely that Afroyim
holds the Constitution is to be satisfied only by a formal renuncia-
tion of citizenship by the individual himself. If this were true there
20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2) (1958); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717
(1952); Monaco v. Dulles, 210 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1954).
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (3) (1958); Marks v. Esperdy, 377 US. 214 (1964) (per
curiam), affirming by an equally divided court, United States cx rel. Marks v. Esperdy,
315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963).
22 The Nationality Act of 1940 attached loss of citizenship to (1) naturalization
in a foreign state, (2) taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, (3) serving in
the armed forces of a foreign state, (4) serving in a government position requiring
naturalization in the foreign state, or taking an oath of allegiance thereto, (5) voting
in a foreign political election, (6) formal renunciation of nationality, (7) deserting
'the armed forces of -this country in time of war, if convicted by a court martial, (8)
committing any act of treason against the United'States, and (9) departing from or
remaining outside this country in time of war for the purpose of evading the draft.
23 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 US. 129, 133 (1958).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
would seem to be no solution to the problem the government claims
is caused by foreign political activity of United States citizens. Con-
gress can probably still provide a procedure, conforming with due
process, to determine in each case how performance of one or more
of these acts illustrates a desire to give up citizenship. It may well
be that following Afroyim certain conduct can serve as objective
evidence of a citizen's desires, in the absence of subjective expres-
sion. Before this question is answered, the line must be drawn be-
tween voluntary relinquishment of citizenship, and congressionally
prescribed conditions for voluntary expatriation.
CORPORATIONS - CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE HOLDERS LIABILITY
UNDER SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 16-Chemical Fund, Inc.
v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967)-Chemical Fund is an
open-end diversified investment company, which in 1963 had ap-
proximately sixty thousand shareholders and owned securities of
sixty-two corporations. It had been a holder of Xerox common
stock since 1954, and in December, 1962, Chemical Fund owned 2.36
percent of the outstanding shares. Early in 1961, Xerox made a
public offering of 15,072,400 dollars principal amount of convert-
ible subordinated debentures. The debentures, which were pro-
tected against dilution and carried no voting rights or participa-
tion in the equity of Xerox, were convertible into Xerox common
stock. Each one thousand dollar debenture was convertible into
approximately 9.5 shares of common stock. In December, 1962, fol-
lowing a program designed to improve the yield from its Xerox
investment without sacrificing its ability to take advantage of the
rising value of Xerox common stock, Chemical Fund commenced
to sell some of its common stock and to purchase Xerox debentures.1
From December 4 to December 20, 1962, and from April 24 to Aug-
ust 2, 1963, Chemical Fund purchased 318,000 dollars principal
amount of debentures, and sold three thousand shares of common
stock. The December 12, 1962, purchase of debentures, together
with the debentures previously owned, resulted in the Fund be-
coming the owner of more than ten percent of the outstanding de.
bentures. It continued to own more than ten percent of the de-
1 The yield on the debentures was approximately 2.8% of the November 0,
1962, mean market price of $1,607.50, compared to a yield on the common of
.66% of the mean price of $150.62. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377
F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967).
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bentures until November 22, 1963, when Xerox called the deben-
tures for redemption.
The Chemical Fund then brought suit for a declaratory judg-
ment that it was not liable for short-swing profits under section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act. Xerox counterclaimed for profits
received by the investment company from its transactions. Granting
a iummary judgment, the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York held Chemical Fund liable for a
profit of 153,972.43 dollars realized by purchases of debentures and
sale of common stock within a six-month period. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision, hold-
ing an investment company owning more than ten percent of a
corporation's convertible debentures, which if converted would
have enabled the investment company to command only 2.72 per-
cent of the corporation's common stock, was not a "beneficial owner
of ten percent of any class of any equity security" within the mean-
ing of the Securities Exchange Act. Therefore, it was not liable for
short-swing trading profits.2
The Securities Exchange Act of 19348 was passed as a result
of abuses prevalent in the area of security exchange. 4 Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act deals with the abuse of a corporate in-
sider recovering profits from short-swing trading in his own corpor-
ate securities.5 Its purpose is to deter officers, directors or other
2 Id. at 107-109.
3 48 Stat. 881 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act], 15 U.S.C. §
78 (1964).
4 See Securities Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) (1959); S. Rz'. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1934); B. GRAm, D. DODD, & S. CO=, SEcuam' ANALYsis
679-81 (4th ed. 1962); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Ex-
change Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1953).
5 Securities Exchange Act § 16 (1934). Section 16 (a) provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an ex-
empted security) which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who
is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file . . . the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner ....
Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than exempted security) within any period of less than six-months ...
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
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beneficial owners of corporate securities from realizing profit
through the use of inside information to which the general stock-
holding public does not have access.8 Thus section 16 imposes a
filing requirement on certain beneficial owners and provides that
such owners shall be liable to the corporation for profits made from
buying and selling its equity securities within a six-month period.
Since its inception, section 16 has been the source of much litiga-
tion concerning such aspects of its application as computation of
profits, 7 definition of buying and selling,8 and other problems of
interpretation. 9 The Xerox case presents the previously undecided
issue of what is meant by a "class of equity security" and whether
convertible debentures comes within this definition.
Under the Securities Exchange Act, there is no dispute that
debentures are considered equity securities. 10 But the debentures
are equity securities only because they include the right to acquire
shares of Xerox common stock. It is more difficult, however, to show
that the debentures are a class of equity security. Nowhere in the
Securities Exchange Act is "class" explicitly defined.
Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co."1 was the
first case to deal with this point. In Ellerin a stockholder brought a
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer ...of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period ex-
ceeding six months.
6 See, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934); Hearings on Stock Ex.
change Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 2d
Sess. 6423, 6430 (1934); B. GRAHAm, D. DODD & C. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 679.81
(4th ed. 1962); L. Loss, SECURTIES REGULATION 1059 (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385-387 (1953);
Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers, and Stockholders: Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. Rv. 133, 134 (1939); Rubin & Feldman,
Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U.
PA. L Rv. 468 (1967); Comment, Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of
Liability, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 472 (1967). Contra, H. MANNE, INsIDmR TRADING AND T1rn
STOCK MAKE (1966).
7 E.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 US. 403 (1962).
8 E.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
9 E.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Ch'. 1945), cert. denied, 320
US. 751 (1943).
10 Securities Exchange Act §- 3(a)(10), (11) (1934). -Section 3(a)(10) provides:
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture . .. "
Section 3(a)(11) provides: "The term 'equity security' means any stock or similar
security, or any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such a
security ......
11 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
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derivative action on behalf of a corporation against an insurance
company dealing in the corporation's stock. The corporation issued
two series of cumulative preferred stock, and the question presented
was whether an owner of ten percent of one series of stock was a
"beneficial owner of ten percent of any class of any equity se-
curity." The court held that each issue of the preferred stock was
a series of the entire class of cumulative preferred stock.2- Since
preferred stock is considered a "class of any equity security," it
would be reasonable to assume that common stock, voting trust
certificates, debentures, and other groups of securities with distinct
and independent qualities would be considered "classes" under
section 16 (b). But the Xerox court, which had eight years earlier
decided Ellerin, dismissed this interpretation of the Ellerin deci-
sion.' 3 Thus the only prior case which had attempted to define the
term "class" was not followed, even though there was no subsequent
case law, statutory history, or legislative definition to justify a con-
trary result. Xerox not only failed to distinguish Ellerin in a mean-
ingful manner, but the decision did not attempt to refute the strong
statutory argument put forward in Ellerin, which would have given
substantial support to the view that debentures are a class of equity
security.' 4 The Xerox court did not address itself to a strict statu-
tory interpretation, which probably would have led to a contrary
holding.15 Furthermore, the court's cursory discussion of Ellerin
suggests that it bypassed the arguments in favor of a liberal inter-
pretation of section 16, reflecting their view of the congressional
purpose behind it. By recognizing that this was the approach taken,
Xerox can be reconciled with Ellerin and the statute.
Previous cases have noted that interpretation of section 16 is
12 Id.
13 877 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1967).
14 The argument is based on the words in 16 (a): "any class of any equity security
which is registered pursuant to section 12 [on a national securities exchange] . . . ."
which are then supposed to bring into play 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12d1-I(a), 240.12dl-l(d).
These sections explain the registration procedures, and they imply that.any type of
security of an issuer which is registered on a national security exchange is a "class of
any equity security." Ellerin held that these statutes do not apply to separate "series"
of one.class of stock, but that they apply to the whole class of securities of which the
series are the parts. 270 F.2d 259, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1959).
15 The briefs for both Chemical Fund and Xerox reflect that both parties felt
the case would turn on whether the transactions involved were exempted arbitrage
transactions, and not on whether the debentures were considered a "class." Brief for
Appellant 19-42, Brief for Appellee 16-42, Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d
107 (2d Cir. 1967).
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not a matter of arbitrary application. The interpretation and ap-
plication of the section should be consistent with its general aims.
In a recent decision a purely semantic argument for the application
of section 16 (b) was rejected by the court:
[T]he inquiry whether a certain transaction lends itself to the
accomplishment of what section 16 (b) is designed to prevent
must be decided 'by the minds of the finders of fact.' This is
true of the task of law application generally. There is no rule
so 'objective' ("automatic" would be a better word) that it does
not require some mental effort in applying it on the part of
the person or persons entrusted by law with its application. 10
Section 16 (a) provides that any person "who is a beneficial owner
of more than 10 per centum of any equity security, must register
his securities .... ." The preamble to section 16 (b) states that its
purpose is to prevent the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner by reason of his relationship
to the issuer. Thus to conclude that debentures were not a class
which Congress intended to include, it must be determined whether
the Chemical Fund's "relationship to the issuer," Xerox, was or
could have been the type of relationship intended to be subject to
the sanctions of section 16.
Directors or officers of a corporation are subject to section 16,
for through their positions they have access to inside information
not available to the market generally.' Congress also concluded
that ownership of ten percent of a class of equity security is relevant
to whether the security owner's relationship to the issuer is such that
he might have access to inside information or have the potential of
16 Blau v. Lamb, 363 F2d 507, 520 (2d Cir. 1966); see, Ferrailo v. Newman, 259
F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), in which Stewart, J.
stated:
It is also apparent, however, that the question is not in any event pri-
marily a semantic one, but must be resolved in the light of tile legislative
purpose-to curb short swing speculation by insiders.... A series of decisions
... have marked out an approach to the problem which is pragmatic rather
than technical. Each case has been decided on its own facts, and the enuncia-
tion of a 'black letter rubric' has been expressly avoided.
See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 827 (1954). Contra, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
17 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 20, Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
18 See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Sec.
tion 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MicH. L. RFv. 133 (1939). See also author.
ities cited supra note 4.
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corporate control. The legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act demonstrates Congress believed that ten percent ownership 0 of
equity securities might lead to this result.- Since Congress has
deemed ten percent ownership as the point at which inside infor-
mation may be accessible, it is not difficult to see why a holder of
ten percent of a corporation's issue of common stock, which usually
carries with it specific voting rights, may have access to inside infor-
mation "by reason of his relationship to the issuer." Nor is it diffi-
cult to see why an owner of ten percent or more of the outstanding
preferred stock, which may have special voting rights attached with
it, should be liable for shortswing profits under section 16(b). An
owner having ten percent of the voting stock of a company, al-
though not in full control of the corporation, is likely to be in a
close relationship to the issuer because his votes usually elect direc-
tors or control certain aspects of corporate policy.2
But does such a relationship to the issuer develop when a stock-
holder owns ten percent of a corporation's convertible debentures,
especially when the debentures gives the owner only the position of
a debt holder entitled to certain specific payments of interest at
stated intervals?2 The type of debenture held by Chemical Fund
had no special or general voting power attached to it, nor did it
have any other characteristic which might permit a debenture
holder to make use of or to have access to inside information. 3 The
19 The House Bill as originally drafted chose 5% as the figure at which control
was possible. This was changed to 10% however, in the final draft. 78 Cotc. Rmc.
73d Gong. 2d Sess. 807 (1934).
20 The original House Bill was supported by its sponsor who said in part:
Mr. Lea of California. I recognize that the 5 percent line is an arbitrary
one. It is variable in its effects in reference to different corporations. As to
all corporations listed on the great exchanges of the country 5 percent repre-
seats an important part of the stock of such corporations. It is so commonly
the case that a man who owns a large amount of stock, but nothing like a
majority, controls the directors of the corporation that the committee thought
it was advisable to require these large stockholders who may be trafficking
in the stock of the corporation to reveal the facts. 78 Cong. Rec., 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8037 (1934).
See, Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on iBanking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6556, 7742 (1934).
21 377 F.2d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1967); see note 20 supra.
22 377 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1967).
23 The motive or intent of the insider is immaterial in determining whether or
not he is liable for short swing profits. Liability attaches even without speculative
intent. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964); Adler v. Klawans,
267 F2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d
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debenture is an equity security because of the conversion rights
attached to it.24 To hold the owner liable would produce the in-
equitable situation pointed out by the Xerox court. That is, the
Chemical Fund would be liable under section 16 (b) because it
owned ten percent of the convertible debentures, even though on
conversion they would control only 2.72 percent of Xerox common
stock, while on the other hand a person owning 9.5 percent of
Xerox common stock would not be considered an insider.
25
Because of the policy behind section 16 and the inequities that
would follow a contrary holding, the Xerox court has rejected a
strict construction of section 16 (b) and has based its opinion on
the underlying congressional purpose. The court held that con-
vertible debentures are not, by themselves, a "class of any equity
security." Instead, the total percentage of common stock which a
holder would own on a hypothetical conversion of his debentures
is the actual test of liability.2 6 The class in other words, is not the
debentures themselves; the class must be determined by the amount
of securities acquirable on conversion.2 7
Although the decision is an equitable interpretation of the
statute, the problem still remains that the statute itself implies a
contrary result. It is foreseeable, therefore, that a subsequent case
may be decided on a strict reading of the statute and a different re-
sult may be reached 28 In cases concerning securities such as con-
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 US. 831 (1956); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
24 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 10.
25 Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1967).
26 Id.
27 The Xerox case seems to be implying that the requisite 10%0 ownership "of
any equity security" is calculated by the amount of common stock outstanding plus
the amount of common stock obtained by the conversion of the debentures of the
alleged 10% holder. But the court leaves unresolved the time at which such a calcu-
lation is to be made; a factor which may have a great effect in determining whether
a debenture owner actually owns 10% of the underlying securities. In a situation
similar to Xerox, when it is more lucrative for a debenture holder to convert his
holdings into common stock -than to allow a company to redeem, it is Inevitable that
a mass conversion by debentures holders will take place. Thus, in a very short period,
the number of shares of common stock outstanding may be greatly increased. Should
the requisite 10% ownership be'calculated on the amount of common stock outstand-
ing before the mass conversion, after the mass conversion, or at the exact time when
a conversion is made by an alleged 10% holder?
28 See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3rd Cir. 1965). This
recent case expressed the view -that the test of liability under section 16 (b) is entirely
"objective." It may be questioned whether or not Xerox would have been decided
the same under this interpretation of the statute.
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vertible preferred stock, warrants, and voting trust certificates, 29
courts following Xerox will be required to determine in each case
whether the rights attached to the convertible securities before con-
version would create the situation of the owner becoming an in-
sider. If such a relationship cannot be established because of the
particular security involved, then the Xerox test of considering
the amount of underlying conversion security as the test for liabil-
ity would apply.
29 Although Xerox held that debentures are not a class of any equity security
in themselves, the court states that the position of the Security Exchange Commis-
sion in their amicus curiae brief may be tenable with respect to holding voting trust
certificates as a class of equity security. Though there are some basic similarities
between convertible debentures and voting trust certificates there are also some sub-
stantial reasons for recognizing a different application of § 16(b) liability as to the
two classes. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 states that percentage ownership of the class of
voting trust certificates shall be "deemed to consist of the amount of voting trust cer-
tificates... issuable with respect to the total amount of outstanding equity securities
of the class which may be deposited under the voting trust agreement... whether
or not all of such outstanding securities have been so deposited... :' Thus an owner
of 10% of the securities in a dosed voting trust limited to 20% of the outstanding
common stock is liable under 16 (b). Although he owns only 2% of the common stock
of the corporation, he may control a 20% bock of votes deposited in the voting trust,
and therefore he could possibly be in a "dose relationship to the issuer." But, assume
that there is an open voting trust formed with 100% of the common stock being the
upper limit of the trust. If 50% of the common stock was deposited in the trust, a
person owning 5% of the stock so deposited would own 10% of the voting trust. Such
an owner may in effect control the whole voting trust and have access to "inside in-
formation" due to his strong position. He would not be liable, however, under 16(b)
for he does not own 10% of the class of common stock. He also does not own 107,
of the voting trust, for under 17 C.FJL 240.16a-2 he does not own 10% of all the
stock which may be deposited under the trust agreement. In this situation and until
more stock is deposited in the trust, such an owner may have access to inside "infor-
mation" due to his strong position, but would escape the liability imposed by § 16 (b).
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